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During World War II, Detroit became widely known as "the arsenal ofdemoc-
racy."I The sheer magnitude of the automobile industry's output of jeeps,
trucks, tanks, aircraft engines, machine guns, bombers, and other tools ofwar
was staggering and played a critical role in the Allied victory.2 After the war,
the automobile industry served as an engine ofgrowth for the domestic econ-
omy. In the decade after Detroit had fully reconverted to domestic automobile
manufacture, factory sales of automobiles increased from 2,148,699 in 1946
to 7,920,186 in 1955. By 1965 that number reached 9,305,561. In that first full
decade of domestic production after the war, labor productivity in motor-
vehicle factories more than doubled, rising from 4.7 vehicles per worker to
10.2. Total factory sales of vehicles in these two decades were 141,001,445,
representing a value of$235.5 billion.3 Factory sales ofmotor vehicles in 1955
and 1965 represented, respectively, 3.6 and 3.2 percent of the United States'
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1. For evidence of Detroit's role in the war effort, see Thomas D. Wolff, "Safeguarding the
Arsenal of Democracy: A History of the Detroit Office of Civilian Defense in World War," M.S.
thesis, Wayne State University, 1952; FreedomsArsenal: The Story ofthe Automotive Councilfor
War Production (Detroit: Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1950); Allan Nevins and Frank
Ernest Hill, '~rsenal of Democracy," in Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-62 (New York: Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1962), 197-227.
2. For a succinct statement of Detroit's output of war materiel during World War II, see James
J. Flink, The Automobile Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 275-76.
3. All statistics cited above derive directly from or were calculated from Automobile Facts and
Figures, 1957 (Detroit: Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1957) and Automobile Facts and
Figures, 1967 (Detroit: Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1967). Figures are not adjusted
for inflation.
185186 David A. Hounshell
gross national product.4 The expression "thecarculture" well describedAmeri-
can's love affair with and dependence upon the automobile.5
While the automobile industry grew in size and output in the two decades
after the war, it virtually also completed the profound restructuring, commonly
known as a shakeout, that had actually begun in the 1910s. By the end ofthe
1930s, the number of firms in the U.S. automobile industry could be counted
on two hands.6 After the war, the industry became even more highly concen-
trated. In 1946, the so-called Big Three (General Motors Corporation, Ford
Motor Company, and Chrysler Corporation) accounted for 84.7 percent ofthe
passenger cars made in the United States; by 1955, they made 95.6 percent.?
Most ofthe "independents" had folded or were near extinction.
WhenWorld War II ended, the Ford Motor Company itself, by all accounts,
appeared to be heading toward bankruptcy and perhaps even extinction. Ford's
market share had declined sharply from its high point in the early 1920s, and
the company's once-famous manufacturing assets had eroded greatly during
the Great Depression ofthe 1930s and the war. 8 The company became leader-
less during the war when Edsel Ford, the son ofthe company's founder Henry
Ford, died prematurely, when Henry Ford himself became too senile to man-
age, when the company was bleeding cash at a rate unrealized because its ac-
counting systems were so poorly designed, and when the company's top man-
agers engaged in internecine rivalry for managerial control ofthe firm. Yet, in
spite ofthese severe problems, the Ford Motor Company endured. For reasons
partially explored in this essay, the company actually experienced what the
historian Allan Nevins and his coauthors called a "rebirth." 9
How FordMotor Company successfully staved offextinction, regained mar-
ket share, and restored profitability surely constitutes one of the great stories
in the history ofAmerican business. This transformation is not, however, the
central focus of this study, although it certainly motivates it. My goal is to
account for the outcome ofa single meeting ofFord's Executive Committee-
4. These figures are calculated from GNP statistics reported in current dollars in Series FI-5 of
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics ofthe United States: Colonial Times to 1970
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 224, and from values ofmotor-vehicle fac-
tory sales reported (in current dollars) in Automobile Facts andFigures, 1968(Detroit: Automobile
Manufacturers Association, 1968).
5. I borrow this expression from James J. Flink, The Car Culture (Cambridge: MITPress, 1975).
6. Philip Hillyer Smith, Wheels within Wheels: A Short History ofAmerican Motor Manufactur-
ing (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968). On the shakeout, see Steven Klepper and Kenneth L.
Simons, "Innovation and Industry Shakeouts," Business and Economic History 25, no. 1 (1996):
81-89.
7. Charles E. Edwards, Dynamics ofthe United States Automobile Industry (Columbia: Univer-
sity ofSouth Carolina Press, 1965), table 1, 13. .,
8. The Ford Motor Company's Annual Report for 1947 shows that the company's market share
had dropped from about 42 percent in 1930 to below 20 percent in 1941 and showed no signs of
reversal had the war not intervened. The report also noted that "for five of the past ten years the
Company has used up plant, property, and equipment faster than it has replaced it, leaving a sub-
stantial capital deficit."
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an outcome that decisively changed the strategic course of the company, a
course that had been formulated and implemented with no little care, a course
devoted to bringing about a major revitalization of the company in the years
after World War II, a course charted to make the Ford Motor Company a formi-
dable competitor of General Motors, which had long since eclipsed it. The
meeting itself, however, wa's not supposed to be about the strategic direction
ofthe company; its nominal purpose was to settle a question about how funds
would be allocated to build engine-manufacturing capacity for the company.
But, in fact, the meeting transformed an operational question into a strategic
one, and in doing so it put on the table the company's history, its in-place physi-
cal assets, and its core capabilities alongside its strategic objectives and oppor-
tunities.
Forourpurposes, the archival records surrounding this fateful meeting could
not be more ideal. We have detailed reports of the plans that led up to the
meeting, and we have reasoned commentaries on those plans. We have docu-
ments that executives carried into the meeting. We have a list ofall the execu-
tives who attended the meeting, and we know a good deal about the back-
grounds ofthese executives and the positions they came into the meeting with.
Finally, we have minutes of the meeting itself. Fortunately for us, however,
the minutes report only the final decision arrived at in the meeting-a major
departure from a unanimous decision reached by the same Executive Commit-
tee less than a month earlier. Other than reporting on how the initial positions
were laid out, the minutes provide only the barest shreds ofevidence of what
took place in the meeting, who said what, and who did what. We are left with
nothing butour own wits-our theories offirms, organizational behavior, and
organizational capabilities-to explain the outcome. This paper is, therefore,
an exercise not unlike those relished by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's fictional
character Sherlock Holmes-shiftingthrough seemingly contradictory and of-
ten parsimonious evidence, bringing behavioral insights into the analysis, mak-
ing careful and reasoned inferences, and testing theories againstknown "facts."
Such an exercise can be both entertaining and illuminating.
5.1 The Fateful Meeting
On 2 December 1949, the Executive Committee of the Ford Motor Com-
pany, the second largest automobile company in the world, convened a meeting
that included not only its own members butalso a group oftop managers repre-
senting the company's manufacturing, marketing, product engineering, and in-
ternal control and monitoring organizations. One item stood at the top of the
committee's agenda: deciding how the company would produce engines for its
future models. But everyone attending the meeting knew that a lot more than
engine production lay at stake. All comprehended at some level that Ford's
strategic plans and the very organizational design of the company as a whole
turned on the meeting's outcome. The issues faced by the group were not new.188 David A. Hounshell
Indeed, Ford's top executives had called this meeting specifically to reconsider
a decision the Executive Committee had made justa month earlier, after which
the full logic ofthat decision had perhaps become clear. 10
At its meeting of 4 November, the Executive Committee had adopted the
recommendations ofits Facilities Committee, a special committee created the
previous May by the company's president, Henry Ford II, and his executive
vice president, Ernest R. Breech. II This new committee essentially functioned
as one of the standing committees that reported to the Policy Committee,
which had charted all aspects ofthe company's strategy since its creation three
years earlier. The Facilities Committee had been charged with responsibility
for resolving production facilities issues. Delmar S. Harder, vice president
ofFord's Manufacturing Division, chaired the committee. Other members in-
cluded Lewis D. Crusoe, the head ofthe newly created Ford Division, Benson
Ford, head ofthe Lincoln-Mercury Division, Robert S. McNamara, controller,
Stanley W. Ostrander, manager of operations for the Lincoln-Mercury Divi-
sion, and R. T. Hurley, Ostrander's counterpart in the Ford Division. 12 When it
was created, the Facilities Committee faced the problem ofensuring the con-
tinued manufacture ofFord V-8 engines, which had been in production since
1932, while also providing for the manufacture of completely new overhead-
valve engines for new model Fords, Mercuries, Lincolns, and, it was antici-
pated, a new, small, European-like automobile.
Since Henry Ford II had assumed control ofFord Motor Company in 1945,
he and the management team he recruited to rebuild the beleaguered company
had been moving toward a decentralized organizational structure modeled ex-
plicitly after that of the General Motors Corporation.
I3 GM was then widely
recognized as the best organized and best managed company in the United
States, if not the world, and its diversified, multidivisional management prin-
ciples and design had been well captured in a now-classic book by Peter
Drucker, The Concept ofthe Corporation, published in 1946.
14 Henry Ford II
had brought to Ford Motor Company several GM executives, including his
executive vice president, Ernest R. Breech; Ford Division head Lewis Crusoe;
and vice president for manufacturing Del Harder. 15 Even before Breechjoined
the company, the young Ford had created the Lincoln-Mercury Division and
10. Minutes ofthe Executive Committee, 2 December 1949, FordIndustrialArchives, Dearborn,
MI, 84-63-1217:1.
11. Minutes ofthe Executive Committee, 4 November 1949.
12. On the creation of the Facilities Committee, see Ernest R. Breech to D. S. Harder et aI.,
Executive Communication, '~ppointment of Special Facilities Committee," 20 May 1949, and
Henry Ford II to E. R. Breech, 16 September 1949, Ford Indw~JrialArchives, 65-71:15.
13. Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline andRebirth, remains the most compelling account ofHenry
Ford II's accession to the throne of the Ford Motor Company and his efforts to rebuild the
company.
14. Peter Drucker, The Concept ofthe Corporation (New York: John Day, 1946).
IS. Harder had come from the presidency ofE. W. Bliss Company, one ofthe leading stamping
press manufacturers, but he had been in that position only briefly. He spent most of his career as
a manager for GM.189 Assets, Organizations, Strategies, and Traditions
given his brother Benson Ford responsibility for its management and perfor-
mance.
16
With the arrival ofBreech and the numerous executives and managers lured
away from GM, commitment to the principle of decentralization grew within
the executive ranks ofthe Ford Motor Company. Throughout 1946, 1947, and
1948, as executives charted. the company's strategy for restructuring and re-
newal in the postwar years, they not only educated employees throughout the
company about the principles ofdecentralization, but they also committed the
company to its realization. 17 In early 1949, the company took a giant step in
that direction when it created a distinct Ford Division to manage the design,
production, and marketing of Ford cars and trucks. Henry Ford II and Ernest
Breech tapped the former GM executive Lewis Crusoe to be the first head of
the new division, and Crusoe was highly committed to the central tenet of
decentralization: achieving the highest performance by a division requires di-
visional autonomy, thereby providing adequate incentives and demanding full
accountability. Throughout this entire period, from mid-1946 through the fall
of 1949, all planning in product design and engineering and manufacturing
facilities had been predicated on the assumption that the Ford Motor Company
was committed to decentralization.
Thus when Del Harder delivered the report and recomlnendations of the
Facilities Committee to the Executive Committee on 4 November 1949, no
one could have been surprised by the assumptions and goals that underlay the
Facilities Committee's work. Its report laid out four alternative plans for meet-
ing the company's future engine manufacture but endorsed only one plan as
being clearly superior to the otherthree. The preferred plan called for the adap-
tation of the Parts and Accessories Building at Ford's famous, massive River
Rouge plant (the Rouge) to engine production and the destruction of the
Rouge's Motor Building. Using machinery and equipment moved from the
Motor Building, the renovated facility would produce 4,135 V-8 engines per
day to meet the continuing demand for this power plant. To make the new
higher-horsepower, higher-performance overhead-valve engine planned for
new Ford, Mercury, and Lincoln models, the Facilities Committee recom-
mended the construction oftwo new engine plants, one to produce the engine
for the Ford (a six-cylinder overhead-valve design) at the rate of2,205 per day,
and the other to make engines for the Mercury (1,973 per day) and the Lincoln
(376 per day). Both the Mercury and the Lincoln engines were to be overhead-
valve V-8 engines manufactured from the same block casting, but they were to
be bored differently, contain different crankshafts, have different strokes, and
thus be ofdifferent horsepower. The Facilities Committee addressed the issue
16. For an overview of the organizational aspects of Ford in the postwar period, see David A.
Hounshell, "FordAutomates: Technology and Organization in Theory and Practice;' Business and
Economic History 24, no. I (1995): 59-71.
17. The company's "master plan" for organizational development and decentralization was
adopted by the Policy Committee in July 1946.190 David A. Hounshell
of supplying castings to the three engine plants,but the plan specified only
that the new engine plant going into the Parts and Accessories Building at the
Rouge would continue to rely upon the Rouge's famous foundry for its cast-
ings. The other two plants, one to be managed by the new Ford Division and
the other to be operated by the older Lincoln-Mercury Division, would either
have to contract for their castings or be supplied by new foundries built for
those plants. As Harder stressed in his presentation, this plan met two principal
criteria-one to supply new engines for new models while maintaining pro-
duction of the older-model engine, and the other to ensure the principle of
divisional autonomy that so much ofthe revitalization and long-range strategy
ofthe company was predicated upon. 18 Members ofthe Executive Committee
found the Facilities Committee's recommendations compelling and voted
unanimously to adopt and implement them. The Facilities Committee esti-
mated the plan would take two years to carry out and cost $187.4 million.
Two weeks later, however, Robert McNamara, Ford's controller and a mem-
ber of the Facilities Committee, dropped a bombshell on the approved plan.
McNamara sent a widely circulated memo to Theodore O. Yntema, vice presi-
dent for finance, saying that, although as a member he had concurred in the
Facilities Committee's recommendation to the Executive Committee, his office
had since conducted a "review of the problem [of engine manufacture] on a
somewhat broader basis" than had the Facilities Committee. As he noted, his
office had gained this "broader" view by relaxing the criteria that had served
as the starting point for the Facilities Committee. For example, as already
noted, the Facilities Committee had based its analysis on the assumption-
flowing out of decentralization principles-that "[e]ngine machining and as-
sembly must be segregated by end product division without regard to engine
interchangeability or relative operating costs ofdifferent plant sizes." Another
criterion, which stemmed from the Executive Committee's earlier decision to
lessen the company's dependence on the Rouge (thereby making the company
less vulnerable to crippling strikes), called for the Rouge to supply no more
than halfthe engines needed by the company. By relaxing this second criterion
while preserving "the rule oforganizational separation," McNamara proposed
an entirely different strategy for meeting the company's engine needs. He
called it "PlanA." The details ofPlan A need not detain us here except to note
that it also included a provision for the purchase of all castings for the new
Ford and Lincoln overhead-valve engines. The bottom line, McNamara prom-
ised, was a savings of some $46 million in investment and manufacturing
costS.1 9
18. "Forward Engine Program Facilities Study," 4 November 1949, included in the Minutes of
the Executive Committee, 4 November 1949.
19. Robert S. McNamara to T. O. Yntema, 18 November 1949, Ford Industrial Archives,
65-71:14. McNamara's Plan A called for the production ofthe new Ford 6 to be carried out at the
Rouge. It thus violated one of the company's explicit criteria, which was to lower the Rouge's191 Assets, Organizations, Strategies, and Traditions
McNamara's PlanA reopened a matter that Harder thought had been settled,
and it put Harder very much on the defensive. Above all, it led to the pivotal
Executive Committee meeting of 2 December 1949. Several members of the
Facilities Committee attended the meeting, plus assorted other managers.
Harder began the meeting by presenting the Manufacturing Division's point-
by-point assessment ofthe costs associated with McNamara's Plan A.20 By the
time Harder had finished, Plan A lay in shambles, and the Executive Commit-
tee had rejected the principal elements ofthe McNamara plan.
Harder then distributed-and read-a new memorandum to the Executive
Committee in which he reassured the committee members that the plan they
had approved a month earlier had been well formulated. The Facilities Com-
mittee, Harder stressed, had carefully developed twenty alternative plans of
which he had presented only the four most attractive ones. He reiterated that
the Executive Committee's decision to build two new engine plants was sound.
Presenting locational data for the two new plants, Harder then asked the com-
mittee to make a decision about where the plants would be built. The choices
included Detroit, Chicago, and Cleveland and combinations thereof. With
these choices Harder also presented cost estimates that included site costs, tax
burdens, and freight rates but did not include wage rates and "laborefficiency"
figures in each of the cities.21 As the minutes of the meeting note, discussion
then "ensued."22
When the meeting adjourned, the committee had determined to build only
one new engine plant (complete with foundry) and to locate it in Cleveland.
But unlike either the previously approved plan or McNamara's Plan A, the
Cleveland plant would be built to manufacture 4,000 to 4,500 engines a day-
essentially the combined daily output projected for the two previously ap-
proved plants. "The actual mix of engines to be manufactured in the new
plant," note the minutes, "wouldbethe subjectoffurther study." The Executive
Committee also reaffirmed the Facilities Committee's original recommenda-
production to 50 percent of the company's parts needs for any major product. (This particular
criterion will be discussed below.) McNamara suggested that the company simply purchase cast-
ings for the new Ford 6 as well as those for the new Lincoln V-8. With some minor rearranging,
he argued, the Rouge's foundry could produce the castings for the new Mercury V-8. He also
suggested other alternatives to the approved plan, including using the company's Detroit-Lincoln
plant for engine manufacture.
20. The Manufacturing Division's critique of MeNamara's Plan A was submitted formally in a
memorandum, "Facility Cost Study Comparison," dated 30 November 1949 and distributed to
those attending the Executive Committee at its meeting of 2 December 1949. I have not located
this actual document but have drawn its conclusions from the Minutes ofthe Executive Committee
Meeting, 2 December 1949.
21. Delmar S. Harder to Henry Ford II et aI., "Forward Engine Program-Facilities Study," 2
December 1949, Ford IndustrialArchives, 65-71:14. Harder noted in this document that "the loca-
tion ofall three plants in Detroit provides the lowest cost point," but Breech annotated his copy of
the locational cost comparisons pointing out that "no effect on costs [is] given to labor efficiency
by locations."
22. Minutes ofthe Executive Committee, 2 December 1949.192 David A. Hounshell
tion to raze the Rouge's old Motor Building and to relocate and upgrade the
classic Ford V-8 engine production to the site's Parts andAccessories Building.
The minutes ofthe same meeting also show that immediately after making
its decisions on engine production, the Executive Committee deferred "consid-
eration ofthe question ofwhether or not to make the Buffalo Stamping Plant
a partofthe FordDivisionuntil such time as the plant was in full production." 23
The Buffalo Stamping Plant was then under construction, the first major
components-manufacturing plant built by Ford Motor Company in the postwar
period. The Buffalo Stamping Plant accorded with the Executive Committee's
clearly delineated strategy oflocating manufacturing capacity away from De-
troit and the Rouge, thereby lessening the company's vulnerability to the labor
militancy that had gripped Detroit and the Rouge since 1937. The committee
sought in particular to restrict the company's dependence on the Rouge for any
component to no more than 50 percent oftotal company needs.
24Although the
Buffalo planthad been authorized before the Executive Committee had created
the Ford Division, Lewis Crusoe had staked a strong claim on organizational
control of the new plant, arguing that its capacity should be devoted to Ford
(as distinct from Mercury and Lincoln) products and that such a move would
advance significantly the company's commitment to the principles of multidi-
visional decentralized management. Crusoe had carefully timed submitting his
claim to the Executive Committee until it had embraced the recommendations
ofthe Facilities Committee, which, as already suggested, it had done 4 Novem-
ber when it authorized an expenditure of$187.4 million for two organization-
ally distinct engine-manufacturing plants. To Crusoe, this authorization was
the clearest signal yet sent that the Ford Motor Company was truly serious
about decentralization.
At this pivotal meeting of 2 December, however, the Executive Committee
had undone its original decision to build two separate engine plants ofdifferent
scales, each to be managed by an autonomous division, and it had decided
instead to build a single, large-scale engine plant, the managerial control of
which it left in the air. Executives had also equivocated on assigning manage-
rial responsibility for the new Buffalo Stamping Plant. Soon afterward, how-
ever, the committee determined to vest responsibility for both the Buffalo
Stamping Plant and the Cleveland Engine Plant, as well as their counterparts
23. Ibid. That the organizational responsibility for the Buffalo Stamping Plant was problematic
is indicated by a set of documents in Breech's papers in which Harder and Breech struggled to
draft a document that laid out the issues surrounding organizational responsibility for the plant.
The final draft was issued as an executive communication to all members ofthe Policy Committee,
15 November 1949, Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:7.
24. Executives had reaffirmed this decision in May 1949 ~hen Ford Motor Company was hit
by a twenty-four-day strike that cost it 1.7 million man-days oflabor at a moment when the com-
pany was unable to satisfy the market for its cars. For more information and perspective on Ford's
postwar labor situation, see David A. Hounshell, "Planning and Executing 'Automation' at Ford
Motor Company, 1945-1965: The Cleveland Engine Plant and Its Consequences," in Fordism
Transformed: The Development ofProduction Methods in the Automobile Industry, ed. Haruhito
Shiomi and Kazuo Wada (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 56-58.193 Assets, Organizations, Strategies, and Traditions
at the Rouge, in a "group" of the Manufacturing Division named the Engine
and Pressed Steel Group.25
The decisions made by the Executive Committee were clearly tantamount
to the company's abandonment ofits strategy to rebuild Ford Motor Company
in the image ofGM. Without planning on it orconsidering the issue in a larger
strategic context, the Executive Committee had essentially decided to end the
three-year drive toward decentralization along product division lines, which
Henry Ford II, Ernest Breech, and other executives recruited from GM had
seen as the key to the renaissance of the Ford Motor Company. Instead, the
Executive Committee set in motion a retreat from reorganizing the company
based on products and a return of the Ford Motor Company to its historic,
production-centered strategy. The imperatives of production ultimately over-
rode all other organizational matters. How did this happen?
5.2 What "Ensued" at the Executive Committee Meeting? An
Exploration ofDecision-Making and Organizational Capabilities
The official minutes of the Executive Committee's meeting of 2 December
clearly note that after Del Harder had made his case for the wisdom of the
Facilities Committee's original recommendations, "[a] general discussion then
ensued." These minutes note further that following this discussion, the Execu-
tive Committee made its already-outlined decision "upon motion duly made,
seconded, and unanimously carried." The recording secretary included no ra-
tionale for the decision, and no discussion is recorded in the minutes.26
What went on in the Executive Committee meeting? Why did the committee
change its decision about how future engines would be produced and what
organizations would manage engine manufacture? Whatphenomenaoforgani-
zational behavior or rules for decision making might have governed the final
outcome? Did "organizational learning" occur as a result of this meeting or
between meetings? What follows is an exploration of several hypotheses that
might account for the phenomena observed at this meeting.
One simple possible explanation for the Executive Committee's major rever-
sal in its strategy might go as follows: Henry Ford II and his lieutenants mis-
understood or miscomprehended the organizational tenets ofGM and the full
implications of those tenets for the Ford Motor Company until questions
emerged about the Facilities Committee's recommendations for the company's
future engine-manufacturing program. Although there is some merit to this
argument, it must be weighed against the strong evidence that Ford's execu-
tives well understood the organizationofGM. Henry Ford II's principal mentor
after 1946 was, as has been already noted, Ernest R. Breech, a man who had
25. Henry Ford II to Vice Presidents et aI., 27 December 1950, Ford Industrial Archives,
65-71:39.
26. Minutes ofthe Executive Committee, 2 December 1949.194 David A. Hounshell
risen to the top of one of OM's divisions and who succeeded in attracting to
Ford Motor Company several highly successful managers who had gained ex-
perience in several divisions ofOM. After BreechjoinedFord as executive vice
president, he conducted thorough briefings for Ford's top and middle managers
about decentralized management principles through a series of "Management
Meetings," which were tape recorded and out of which were published care-
fully prepared reports that were circulated throughout the company. Delivered
13 May 1947 at a meeting devoted to "Organizational Problems and Plans of
the Ford Motor Company," Breech's first, foundational briefing was a tour de
force. Itpresented a clear and persuasively argued case for the decentralization
ofmanagement at Ford, and it clearly carried the endorsement ofHenry Ford
II. 27 In subsequent Management Meetings, other top Ford executives laid out
how the principles ofdecentralization were being implemented in their respec-
tive domains of expertise and operations.28 Never before in the history ofthe
Ford Motor Company had such attention been given to matters oforganization.
In short, the evidence is overwhelming that Ford's executives well understood
the principles ofdecentralized management.
Yet the application of these principles to Ford Motor Company proved to
be particularly problematic. Ford was a highly centralized organization that
historically had answered to the commands of a single voice-the firm's re-
cently deceased founder, Henry Ford, who had publicly ridiculed the idea of
organization and boasted that his company had no organization charts. The
Flivver King was now gone, and his grandson commanded the company with
a far greater appreciation of organization and organizational principles. But
the decentralization ofthe Ford Motor Company was not straightforward. The
company produced only three models ofautomobiles-the Ford, the Mercury,
and the Lincoln. Henry Ford II had created the Lincoln-Mercury Division as
one of his first acts of leadership of the beleaguered company, and, as noted,
the company had established a Ford Division in early 1949. But deep questions
of divisional autonomy existed, and surely much of the discussion on 2 De-
cember revolved around this issue. Since 1946, top executives in the company
had bandied about the idea ofcreating an entirely new division ofthe company
to manufacture and market a new European-style "lightweight" automobile.
Discussion had grown so serious that the company formally announced the
creation of a Light Car Division in August 1946. The new division appeared
on organization charts circulated within the company and was always part of
strategic discussions at the executive level.
Planning for the design, styling, manufacturing, and marketing ofthe small
27. Ford Motor Company, Report of Management Meeting, May 1947, Ford Industrial Ar-
chives, 65-71:36.
28. See, for example, Del Harder's presentation on the application ofdecentralization principles
to the Manufacturing Division in "The Manufacturing Story," Ford Motor Company, Report of
Management Meeting, no. 9, March 1948, Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:36.195 Assets, Organizations, Strategies, and Traditions
car proved to be problematic, however. The Ford Motor Company had rapidly
deteriorated during World War II. Conversion ofthe company's manufacturing
capacity to wartime products, the long, painful death of the company's presi-
dent Edsel Ford (Henry Ford's son, whose administration had often been un-
dermined by his father), palace intrigue over who would take the reins of the
company, and failure to invest in new plant and equipment had crippled the
company. During the war, the Roosevelt administration had actually considered
taking over the management ofthe company because it deemed Ford's manu-
facturing assets and capabilities to be a matter of national security, and when
those capabilities began to slip noticeably, alarms in Washington began going
off. Reconverting the company's manufacturing capacity to automobile pro-
duction, getting new models designed and into production, reinvesting in new
plant and equipment, and rebuilding the organization proved to be an almost
overwhelming task for Henry Ford II and his lieutenants. Thus the launch of
an entirely new car division kept getting pushed back as debate grew over
whether the American car buyer wanted a light automobile.
29
From the records I have examined, I have been unable to discern clearly
who were the proponents ofa European-style caramong Ford's top executives.
Henry Ford II and Ernest Breech appear to have been among the early advo-
cates, but this assessment is not based on particularly strong evidence. Except
for one person, the opponents are even less clear. Lewis Crusoe was clearly
opposed to the light vehicle idea. As noted, Breech had recruited Crusoe to
Ford where he initially served as vice president for operations (i.e., as Breech's
principal assistant). Crusoe and Breech had worked together when Breech
headed GM's Bendix Division. After arriving at Ford in 1946, Crusoe moved to
various assignments, including head ofthe Division ofPlanning and Control,
controller, vice president offinance, and then, as noted, as the first head (vice
president) ofthe Ford Division.30 Crusoe was an ardent champion ofdecentral-
ized managerial organization and espoused the central tenetofdivisional au-
tonomy. Although championing decentralization, Crusoe nonetheless opposed
the idea ofthe Ford Motor Company's manufacturing a light vehicle and thus
by definition opposed the idea ofa Light Car Division.3l By 1949 when Crusoe
took charge ofthe new Ford Division, the consumer preferences ofAmericans
29. The 1946-49 debate about the creation of a small "Euro-style" car was not entirely new.
Officials at Ford had waged the same debate in the late 1920s and 1930s, as is masterfully re-
counted in Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford: Expansion andChallenge, 1915-1933 (New
York: Scribner's, 1957).
30. The best account of Crusoe's background at OM and work at Ford appears in Nevins and
Hill, Ford: Decline andRebirth.
31. Crusoe's opposition to the light vehicle emerges in his role as head ofthe committeeexamin-
ing the company's "forward engine program," the records of which are quite extensive and are
contained in the Ford Industrial Archives, largely in the papers of Ernest R. Breech, 65-71. In
addition, in an interview with me in Washington, DC, on 7 September 1994, Robert McNamara
told me that Crusoe was adamantly opposed to the idea ofa small car.196 David A. Hounshell
had become increasingly clear. The move was toward bigger and more power-
ful cars. Ford's top managers quietly killed the light-vehicle project.32
Ironically the abandonment ofthe Light Car Division may have undermined
Crusoe's designs on the Ford Division's gaining control over its own manufac-
turing operations, a critical element of divisional autonomy in Crusoe's opin-
ion. With the Light CarDivision no longer in the strategic plan oron the organ-
ization chart, that left only the new Ford Division and the Lincoln-Mercury
Division. Some managers had argued for dividing the latter division in two,
but the arguments against this easily carried the day, principally because ofthe
small sales ofthe Lincoln automobile.33 More important was the overwhelming
incongruity between the size of the Ford Division and that of the Lincoln-
Mercury Division. The Ford Division was essentially the Ford Motor Com-
pany. This asymmetry could well have been a crucial factor in the discussion
that ensued at the Executive Committee meeting of 2 December 1949. With
the company's having only one significant product division, there may have
seemed little point in giving the head of this division authority over new and
upgraded components-manufacturing capacity such as the projected Cleveland
Engine Plant, the nearly completed Buffalo Stamping Plant, and the refur-
bished engine plant that was to be moved into the Rouge's Parts and Accessor-
ies Building.34
Since the company had first headed down the road toward decentralization,
Ford's River Rouge complex had loomed as a huge obstacle to decentraliza-
tion, both physically and psychologically. The Rouge was the physical mani-
festation ofHenry Ford's and his lieutenant Charles Sorensen's obsession with
large-scale, high-throughput, integrated manufacturing. Built in the late 1910s
and the early 1920s, the Rouge was designed to take iron ore and coal in at
one end ofthe complex and to ship finished automobiles out the other.35 Henry
Ford's goal was to make the Rouge an autarkical empire, and certainly that was
32. The Light Car Division continued its existence until the third quarter of 1947 when the
Policy Committee reversed itself within a thirty-day period, going from a decision of "full speed
ahead" in mid-August 1947 to total abandonment ofthe Light CarDivision in September after the
results of a Ford-commissioned survey showed that Americans wanted bigger, roomier, faster,
more powerful cars. Nevertheless, the idea ofa light car remained fixed in some executives' minds
and thus intruded into much ofthe company's long-term planning process (Nevins and Hill, Ford:
Decline and Rebirth, 333). Even as late as 8 February 1949, the idea of a small car was still a
major agenda and discussion item at the meetings of the Forward Product Planning Committee.
See the minutes ofthe committee for that date, Ford Industrial Archives, 65~71:14.
33. Even as late as October 1949, the idea ofsplitting the Lincoln-Mercury Division in two was
still being bandied about but not very seriously. See C. E. Bosworth to Ernest R. Breech, 19 Octo-
ber 1949, Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:39.
34. Breech's thinking about the problems of organizationally situating a plant that produced
parts for two or more product divisions is interesting and is faid out nicely in Ernest R. Breech
to All Members of the Policy Committee, "Question of Organization Responsibility-Buffalo
Stamping Plant," 15 November 1949, Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:7.
35. On the development of the Rouge, see Nevins and Hill, Ford: Expansion and Challenge,
which remains the best treatment of this subject. See also Lindy Biggs, The Rational Factory:
Architecture, Technology, and Work in AmericasAge ofMass Production (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
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the image that he liked to promote and that the complex itself conveyed. But
by no means was that the reality, at least not in the period under discussion.
After Ford Motor Company changed over from the Model T to the Model A in
1927/28 and then was forced soon after to introduce the V-8, the company had
increasingly relied upon outside suppliers for its components to save on capital
costs associated with model- changes and to decrease changeover times.36 In-
deed, when Ernest Breech and his associates defected from GM to Ford, they
were shocked to learn that the degree of integration at Ford was significantly
lower than that of GM. They immediately set about to reintegrate the Ford
Motor Company.37
The Rouge figured only negatively in Ford's decentralization and reintegra-
tion plans, however. Soon after GM was humiliated with the Flint sit-down
strike and was forced to recognize the United Auto Workers as the collective
bargaining agent of its workers, GM's executives had initiated a strategy of
dispersing its factories-locating them away from Detroit in areas where labor
was believed to be less well organized and less militant.38 Ford's GM expatri-
ates quickly brought this policy into force at Ford, and the Buffalo Stamping
Plant was the first of many, many plants that Ford built away from Detroit in
the two decades after World War II. Ford pursued this policy in spite of its
economic studies showing that unit costs for components such as steel stamp-
ings and engines would be lower ifcapacity were added in Detroit (including
at the Rouge).39
This policy of dispersing Ford's manufacturing capacity caused enormous
confusion among the company's workforce (including middle managers), espe-
cially because it was implemented after the company had begun to espouse
and then execute its program of decentralizing its organizational structure.
Confusion about what "decentralization" really meant reached such a level
soon after the company announced its plans for the Cleveland Engine Plant
that Ernest Breech, Theodore Yntema (vice president for finance), Del Harder
(vice president for manufacturing), and John S. Bugas (vice president for in-
36. On Ford's increasing reliance on outside suppliers, see DavidA. Hounshell, From theAmeri-
can System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development ofManufacturing Technology in
the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 300. A good indicator of
Ford's reliance on outside suppliers is the company's purchase of bodies at the time the Buffalo
Stamping Plant was undertaken. Ford purchased 40 percent of its bodies from outside suppliers.
See Project Appropriation Request, 23 June 1949, bound in "Proposed New Pressed Steel Plant,"
Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:41.
37. Oral History Interview with John Dykstra, Ford Archives, accession 975, box 1, Dearborn.
For quantitative estimates ofFord's and GM's relative degrees ofintegration, see Harold Katz, The
Decline ofCompetition in the Automobile Industry, 1920-1940 (New York: Arno Press, 1977),
especially chapter 6.
38. On GM's dispersal policy, see Douglas Reynolds, "Engines ofStruggle: Technology, Skill,
and Unionization at General Motors, 1930-1940," Michigan Historical Review 15, no. 1 (1989):
69-82; James M. Rubenstein, The Changing U.S. Automobile Industry: A Geographical Analysis
(London: Routledge, 1992).
39. Studies for what became the Buffalo Stamping Plant and the Cleveland Engine Plant showed
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dustrial relations) felt compelled to give a company-wide briefing to tell man-
agers and workers that the geographic dispersion ofFord's manufacturing ca-
pacity was not what the company meant by decentralization ofmanagement.40
Geographic dispersion and organizational decentralization might have con-
fused the bulk ofFord's workforce, but certainly the company's top managers
understood these two strategies were not to be confused with each other even
though they could be complementary. As Lewis Crusoe well recognized, the
Facilities Committee's recommendation to the Executive Committee to build
two separate engine plants away from Detroit, each managed by a different
division, would simultaneously meet each condition.
The configuration ofthe huge Rouge plant's operations, which reflected the
obsession of the post-1918 Model T Ford Motor Company with technically
"efficient" production to the exclusion ofother cost considerations, stood as a
huge impediment to decentralization of management. In many respects, the
Rouge was the Ford Motor Company, and to parse the company into autono-
mous divisions meant parsing the Rouge. And it simply would not parse along
product lines. Despite considerable efforts by managers and executives who
truly wanted to see the decentralization of Ford management and who truly
understood the company's manufacturing operations, the Rouge would parse
only along functional lines (steel production, foundry, engine plant, parts and
accessories, etc.). The Ford Motor Company's assembly operations appear to
have been the only easily product-parsed manufacturing facilities ofthe com-
pany, but this situation must have been so self-evident to executives that they
never spent any time discussing it.
So, to return to the original hypothesis, does possible confusion over organi-
zational principles on executives' parts stand up to the test? The evidence sug-
gests that Ford's top executives well understood the principles ofdecentraliza-
tion but that Ford's in-place physical assets-especially the Rouge plant-
made the literal decentralization ofthe company along product lines problem-
atic at best and impossible at worst. The simultaneous dispersal ofmanufactur-
ing capacity away from the Rouge and the vesting ofmanagerial responsibility
for these new manufacturing assets in the hands of autonomous product divi-
sions would certainly have moved the company toward its publicly articulated
strategy of decentralization. Even committing the company to the long-term
reorganization of the Rouge along product lines without dispersal away from
the Rouge would, in theory at least, have been possible but was apparently
ruled out. This discussion has centered only on the company's physical assets,
and surely the Rouge's physical structures were paralleled by human, organiza-
tional assets that might also have seemed difficult to parse along product as
opposed to functional lines.
But what explanation will hold up? In his Fels Lectures on Public Policy
40. Ernest R. Breech, "Decentralization-What It Is and How It Works"; T. O. Yntema, "The
Profit Center System"; Delmar S. Harder, "Decentralization in Practice"; John S. Bugas, "Decen-
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Analysis, published in 1974 under the title The Limits ofOrganization, econ-
omist Kenneth Arrow suggests that individuals and organizations develop
"codes" that govern their operation over time. He uses the term "code," as he
notes, "both literally and metaphysically. It refers to all the known ways,
whether or not inscribed in formal rules, for conveying information." As Ar-
row argues,
[O]rganizations, once created, have distinct identities, because the costs of
changing the code are those ofunanticipated obsolescence.
Becker and others have stressed that a significant part ofaccumulation of
human capital consists of training specific to the needs of a firm, an input
of information to the worker which increases his value to the firm but not
to other firms....
One might ask, as one does frequently in the theory ofthe firm, why all
firms do not have the same codes, so that training in the code is transferable?
In the first place, in this combinatorial situation, there may easily be many
optimal codes, all equally good, but to be useful in a firm it is important to
know the right code....
In the second place, history matters. The code is determined in accor-
dance with the best expectations at the time of a firm's creation. Since the
code is part of the firm's or more generally the organization's capital, as
already argued, the code of a given organization will be modified only
slowly over time.41
Arrow's notion of "code" has not been developed directly by many scholars,
but it bears some semblance to ideas developed in the late 1980s and early
1990s by a wide range of scholars, all writing in one way or another about
organizational capabilities.42
In their highly influential, now-classic article, "The Core Competence ofthe
Corporation," C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel identify "core competencies" as
those things that provide a firm competitive advantage over another firm, all
else being equa1.43 David Teece, Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen define core
41. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits ofOrganization (New York: Norton, 1974),55-56.
42. This paper cannot purport to offer a comprehensive review ofthe literature on the organiza-
tional capabilities view ofthe firm. The following pieces do offer such a review: Alfred D. Chan-
dler, Jr., "Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History ofthe Industrial Enterprise;' Jour-
nal ofEconomic Perspectives 6, no. 3 (1992): 79-100; Richard N. Langlois, "The Capabilities of
Industrial Capitalism," Critical Review 5 (1992): 513-30; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, "Core Capa-
bilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New Product Development;' Strategic Man-
agement Journal 13 (1992): 111-25; Ross Thomson, ed., Learning and Technological Change
(New York: St. Martin's, 1993) (see especially the chapters by Chandler and William Lazonick);
Richard S. Rosenbloom and Clayton M. Christensen, "Technological Discontinuities, Organiza-
tional Capabilities, and Strategic Commitments," Industrial and Corporate Change 3 (1994):
655-85; William Lazonick and William Mass, eds., Organizational Capability and Competitive
Advantage: Debates, Dynamics, andPolicy (Brookfield, VT: E. Elgar, 1995). Ofcourse, the work
ofEdith Tilton Penrose, The Theory ofthe Growth ofthe Firm (New York: Wiley, 1959), is funda-
mental.
43. "The Core Competence of the Corporation," Harvard Business Review 68 (May 1990):
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capabilities as "a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and rou-
tines that provide the basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable
advantage in a particular business."44 Historians such as Alfred Chandler and
William Lazonick have for a long time been using the concept of organiza-
tional capabilities to account for some firms' superior performance relative to
their competitors, all else being equa1.45
Dorothy Leonard-Barton, however, has argued that core capabilities carry
with them a Janus-faced twin, "core rigidities." As she explains, "Core rigidi-
ties are the flip side of core capabilities. They are not neutral; these deeply
embedded knowledge sets actively create problems." Leonard-Barton main-
tains, moreover, that "core rigidities are more problematic for projects that are
deliberately designed to create new, nontraditional capabilities."46
Within the evolutionary economics framework constructed by Richard Nel-
son and Sidney Winter, we find concepts that bear some similarity to Arrow's
notion of codes and the core capabilities ideas described above.47 Nelson and
Winter speak of informal decision rules and routines that economic actors,
including firms, develop over time, which in large measure govern their behav-
ior and performance. Some firms' decision rules and routines bring favorable
(i.e., asymmetrical) returns in an environment. These firms flourish. A change
in the environment (e.g., a change in the underlying technology ofan industry)
can eliminate these firms unless either these decision rules and routines work
well in the new environment or a firm changes its decision rules and routines.48
Was the Executive Committee meeting of2 December 1949 an occasion in
which the "code" ofthe FordMotorCompany, which the organization acquired
early in its history when Henry Ford and his lieutenants were committing the
company to mass-production principles, overtly expressed itselfin the decision
to build a single, large-scale plant that would yield engines ofthe lowest unit
cost? Was the "GMcode" brought to Ford by Breech and the other high execu-
tives too meager to produce any radical shift in the company's behavior? Were
the costs ofchanging the Ford code too high? Had the former GM executives,
such as Vice President for Manufacturing Del Harder, fallen into the Fordist
decision rules and routines ofold, opting for the principle oflowest unit cost
at whatever the costoforganizational design, product flexibility, and otherben-
efits attributed to decentralized divisional autonomy? Did the decision to build
44. "Firm Capabilities, Resources, and the Concept ofStrategy," Consortium on Competitive-
ness and Cooperation Working Paper 90-9, Center for Research in Management, University of
California, Berkeley, 1990, as quoted in Leonard-Barton, "Core Capabilities and Core Rigidi-
ties," 112.
45. See note 43 above. See also Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., S2ale and Scope: The Dynamics of
Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
46. Leonard-Barton, "Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities," 118.
47. Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory ofEconomic Change
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
48. See also the now-classic paper by M. L. Tushman and P. Anderson, "Technological Discon-
tinuities and Organizational Environments,"Administrative Science Quarterly 31 (1986): 439-65.201 Assets, Organizations, Strategies, and Traditions
a single plant revolve around Ford executives' realization that rather than emu-
late GM the company had to rely upon and indeed renew Ford's fundamental
core capabilities-efficient production engineering-to gain competitive ad-
vantage? Or was the decision a manifestation of core rigidities in which the
logic of"but we've always done it this way" gained the upper hand?
The work of the Facilities Committee had been carried out in parallel with
that of another committee created by the Executive Committee, the Forward
Product Planning Committee, the group charged with developing medium- and
long-range strategies for putting new Ford products on the market. Member-
ship on the two committees overlapped to a certain degree, and clearly the
most important overlapping member was Del Harder. Harder was joined on the
Forward Product Planning Committee by, among others, the vice president for
engineering (Harold Youngren, another defector from GM) and the vice presi-
dent for finance (Theodore O. Yntema, who came to Ford from the business
school at the University ofChicago). When the committee took up its work in
the autumn of 1948, it had to deal with the question of exactly what engines
would be going into the company's projected models. Indeed, the company's
entire "forward product planning" revolved around decisions about engines.
This fact is made clear by the review of the forward engine program carried
out by the Finance Division when it was headed by Lewis Crusoe, just before
he became the head ofthe Ford Division. This review fed into the work ofthe
Forward Product Planning Committee.
For its review, the Finance Division, with the concurrence ofboth the Engi-
neering Division (product design) and the Manufacturing Division, established
at the outset five first principles or basic assumptions to guide the formulation
and execution ofits strategy vis-a-vis engines. One principle simply stipulated
which new engine would be built first, while the second stated that the daily
capacity figures were to be derived from estimations ofanticipated sales ofthe
new models. These two principles were highly pragmatic and had virtually no
radical implications for the company's organization and operational routines.
The third and fourth principles had rather profound implications that may well
have conditioned the discussion that ensued on 2 December. Engines put in
future products, the third principle specified, "wouldbe processed without lim-
itation by present practice." That is, the company would not be bound by pres-
ent manufacturing technology in the manufacture of new engines. This prin-
ciple in effect declared that the company would pioneer new manufacturing
technologies. The fourth principle stated that the new engines "would be made
without regard to the present facilities" (i.e., the Motor Building at the Rouge
and perhaps even the entire Rouge plant). This principle was certainly consis-
tent with the company's emerging policy ofdispersing capacity outside ofDe-
troit. For the purposes of establishing high and low investment information,
the cost of the "ideal" production process for engines would be estimated if
installed in an entirely new plant (high) and if ",fitted into existing buildings
with a minimum ofoutside plant" investment (low). The committee's fifth prin-202 David A. Hounshell
ciple was that the Ford Motor Company should manufacture all its engines
rather than relying upon any suppliers.
49
The Executive Committee, therefore, carried out its discussion on 2 Decem-
ber in the context of several of its members' having earlier committed them-
selves to the principles of self-sufficiency and of not being bound by present
manufacturing technology and present manufacturing facilities. Did these
commitments conflict with the organizational design principle ofbuilding two
separate engine plants, each different in scale, each with different unit costs,
and each managed by autonomous product divisions? In other words, did the
organizational design principle so conflict with the self-sufficiency and tech-
nology principles as to be undermined by the latter?
Or did the plan that was adopted by the Executive Committee represent a
compromise among those who attended the meeting? Here, too, history mat-
ters. When Henry Ford II took charge ofthe Ford Motor Company and set out
to rebuild the failing enterprise, one ofhis first high-impact decisions was to
hire as a package a group of ten young, intelligent, ambitious men who had
been part ofthe enterprising and highly successful Office ofStatistical Control
within theArmyAirForces during World War II. Headed by their commanding
officer, Charles B. "Tex" Thornton, who had created and managed the Office
ofStatistical Control, the group quickly became known as the Whiz Kids. Al-
though none had ever set foot in an automobile plant, the group (both individu-
ally and collectively) maintained that they had the analytical skills necessary
to manage any complex undertaking, including automobile manufacturing.
Henry Ford II bought into this argument, and even after Ernest Breech and the
other GM managers joinedthe Ford Motor Company, the Whiz Kids continued
to impress their mark on the company. Two ofthe Whiz Kids would go on to
become presidents of the company, and four would become vice presidents.
Only the commander ofthe Whiz Kids, Tex Thornton, encountered rough wa-
ters at Ford. Thornton aspired to great things; Breech did too. Soon after join-
ing Ford and seeing Thornton's mode of operation, Breech informed Henry
Ford II that the company was not big enough for both Thornton and himself
and that the president had to choose who was going to stay. Henry Ford II
chose Breech. The remaining Whiz Kids, however, played critical roles in the
rebuilding of the Ford Motor Company, and their talents and drive were
quickly appreciated by Breech and his lieutenants from GM.50
49. L. D. Crusoe to Henry Ford II, "Preliminary Review of Proposed Engine Program," 13
December 1948, Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:14. As already noted, the GM personnel who
came to Ford in the immediate postwar period were surprised ~t the extent to which Ford relied
upon external suppliers for its major components. They believed that a high priority for the new
Ford company should be to reintegrate manufacturing. The construction ofthe Buffalo Stamping
Plant was predicated in large part in reducing Ford's dependence on outside suppliers for 40 per-
cent ofits bodies and body parts.
50. The history of the Whiz Kids is treated in Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline and Rebirth;
David Halberstam, The Reckoning (New York: Morrow, 1986); John A. Byrne, The Whiz Kids:
Ten Founding Fathers ofAmerican Business and the Legacy They Left Us (New York: Currency
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Since none ofthe Whiz Kids possessed experience in manufacturing opera-
tions, their principal work at Ford centered on organization, information, and
analysis. Their fundamental premise was that, if the company could develop
an effective system of information flow and control, they could maximize its
performance using decision methods that some had learned at Harvard Busi-
ness School before the war and that the group had developed further in the
Office of Statistical Control during the war. Fundamental to this process was
the reduction ofinformation into quantitative units. Quantification ofinforma-
tion allowed its manipulation while also ostensibly eliminating the bias that
typically attended assessment ofqualitative information. In the postwar years
leading up to the 2 December meeting, the Whiz Kids had worked valiantly to
develop an information-generating and -control system that Ford's top manage-
ment could use to know truly what was going on within and at all levels ofthe
corporation. This system went well beyond a traditional financial accounting
system that kept tabs on monetary transactions. The Whiz Kids developed a
control system that measured a wide spectrum ofcorporate performance-all
based on quantitative indices.
The epitome of the Whiz Kids' fundamental belief structure was Robert
McNamara, who by the time of the 2 December meeting was the Ford Motor
Company's controller. He had studied and taught business management at Har-
vard Business School, where he had become a disciple of Robert Anthony, a
professor ofaccounting whose philosophy was that accounting should provide
the principal means ofcontrol and decision making in the corporation. Under
Anthony, McNamara had mastered the case on return-on-investment calcula-
tions and decision criteria that Donaldson Brown had developed at the Du Pont
Company and had then transferred to OM after Du Pont gained control ofOM
in 1919.
51 Under Tex Thornton, McNamara had carried out statistically rich
analyses of the Army Air Forces' operations that he believed could both ac-
count for and optimize that service's performance in the conduct of the war.
At Ford, McNamara fell under Lewis Crusoe's wing, essentially following
Crusoe's movement up the command structure while mastering the lessons the
former assistant treasurer at OM taught him. McNamara had backed up
Crusoe's work on the Forward Product Planning Committee, and after Crusoe
became the first head of the Ford Division, McNamara, now controller, had
served on the Facilities Committee with Crusoe, where he clearly supported
Crusoe's pursuit ofa OM structure and strategy at the Ford Motor Company.
Yet McNamara went beyond Crusoe in his work as controller. Under McNa-
mara, the Controller's Office extended its reach throughout the corporation,
gathering increasing amounts ofinformation and using that information to as-
sess-andchallenge-the operations and decision making ofunits throughout
the company. McNamara's 18 November memorandum questioning the Execu-
tive Committee's 4 November decision to build two engine plants in accor-
51. In an interview with me in Washington, DC, 7 September 1994, Robert McNamara was still
able to recite chapter and verse ofthe principal aspects ofDonaldson Brown's ROI formulation.204 David A. Hounshell
dance with the recommendations ofthe Facilities Committee (ofwhich he was
a member) typified his mode of operation, forcing managers like Del Harder
to develop arguments that could withstand McNamara's quantitative chal-
lenges to operational and strategic decisions.
McNamara's memo was unquestionably the catalyst that forced the Execu-
tive Committee's reassessment ofits earlier decision to build two separate en-
gine plants. But what role did McNamara actually play in the 2 December
meeting? Certainly the minutes of the meeting make clear that Del Harder
succeeded, point by point, in showing how McNamara's plan to supply en-
gines-developed only from numerical analysis rather than operational expe-
rience that took account of reality-simply would not work. But if McNa-
mara's plan was rejected, does this mean that McNamara's credibility was
effectively undermined at the meeting and in subsequent events at Ford? Cer-
tainly the postmeeting evidence suggests that McNamara's star continued its
meteoric rise at Ford. (McNamara succeeded Crusoe as head ofthe Ford Divi-
sion and then became president of the entire Ford Motor Company not long
before he departed to become secretary of defense under President John F.
Kennedy.)52 McNamara's challenge to the Facilities Committee's recommenda-
tions, as he went outofhis way to point out, in no way questioned the organiza-
tional design criterion ofpreserving divisional autonomy over engine manufac-
ture that had been fundamental to all product planning and corporate-wide
organizational changes during the previous three years. Yet when the Executive
Committee ended its meeting on 2 December, it had taken actions that, (1)
essentially realized the spirit of McNamara's 18 November memo, which was
fundamentally intended to save the company money, and (2) essentially aban-
doned the principle ofdivisional autonomy over manufacturing operations.
Was this outcome a compromise offered by Controller McNamara? Did it
provide the proponents ofFordist lower unit costs with what they wanted (pre-
sumably a bigger, more specialized plant) while promising the proponents of
divisional autonomy an attractive alternative? What was the alternative, and
what role would McNamarahave had in offering it?Although evidence is lack-
ing from the meeting itself, postmeeting evidence suggests that McNamara
could well have forged the compromise, a compromise in which his own office
stood to gain as well. The compromise was simple: maintain the historic
strength ("code," "core capability," "routine") ofthe Ford Motor Company by
building the largest-scale, most technologically advanced, lowest-unit-cost fa-
cility to be managed by the Manufacturing Division; at the same time, employ
the emerging information and control system being developed by the Control-
ler's Office to allow the heads ofproduct divisions to monitor costs and quality
of components being made by the Manufacturing Division and "sold" to the
52. Byrne, Whiz Kids, provides a biographical sketch of McNamara and his subsequent career
beyond Ford, but the best biography ofMcNamara published to date is Deborah Shapley, Promise
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product division. The development ofwhat became known as "transferpricing
systems" would allow the Ford Motor Company to develop itselfinto a hybrid
organization-a firm showing many of the dominant characteristics of the
highly centralized, efficient-manufacturing company that Henry Ford had first
built while providing an ersatz or virtual expression ofthe information flows,
accounting mechanisms, and control structures that characterized a multidivi-
sional, decentrally managed organization like GM. Massive flows ofquantita-
tive data and sophisticated methods of analyzing these data-things that the
Controller's Office was specializing in-providedthe key to this step. The con-
troller would provide the heads of divisions with the means to gain all the
benefits ofdecentralization without its higher unit manufacturing costs.
5.3 The Outcome
Whether Robert McNamara actually invoked transfer pricing as a kind of
deus ex machina at the Executive Committee meeting of2 December can only
be a matter of pure speculation.53 The same is true with our own offering of
"codes," "core capabilities," "core rigidities," and "organizational routines," as
mechanisms that account for the Executive Committee's about-face of 2 De-
cember 1949. Readers may well have their own framework for explaining what
ensued at the meeting. But the actual outcome of the Executive Committee's
decision at this fateful meeting is definitely not subject matter for speculation.
The decision led directly to the design, construction, and opening ofthe Cleve-
land Engine Plant, complete with its own automated foundry. Less than six
weeks after the Executive Committee's meeting, the Ford Motor Company pur-
chased a 200-acre tract of land in Brookpark, Ohio, a community adjacent to
the Cleveland Airport. Five months later, construction began at the site, and
in December 1951-two years after the fateful meeting-production of six-
cylinder overhead-valve engines began at the Cleveland Engine Plant.54 The
plant itselfwas hailed as the most advanced factory in the world, and its open-
ing will forever be tied to the advent of "automation," a word that Ford's Del
Harder coined to describe the automatic loading and unloading ofworkpieces
in machinery such as stamping presses and machine tools and the automatic
movement of these workpieces between such machines.55 The Cleveland En-
gine Plant was a piece ofpure Fordism. It consisted ofhighly specialized ma-
53. This statementis only partially true. In my 7 September 1994 interview, McNamara asserted
that his control system and especially the development oftransfer pricing allowed Ford to reap the
benefits ofcentralized management ofproduction while maintaining a semblance ofdecentraliza-
tion. McNamara went on to say that many ofthe Ford executives from OM remained so wedded
to the OM way ofdoing things that they could not function well in the new Ford organization.
54. The development and early operation of the Cleveland Engine Plant are treated in Houns-
hell, "Planning and Executing 'Automation.'"
55. James R. Bright, Automation and Management (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1958);
Joseph Oeschelin, "Engine Plant Operation by Automation," Automotive Industries 106 (1 May
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chinery tied together with materials-handling equipment and fed by a continu-
ous stream ofraw materials. The pace of work at the factory was determined
not by those who worked there but by the machines that dominated the factory.
The Cleveland Engine Plant was the progenitor of several other automated
engine plants built by Ford in the decade after 1952. Cleveland Engine Plant
II was planned soon after Cleveland Engine Plant I opened; its product was
geared to providing Ford's first major entrant into the rapidly developing
"horsepower race" ofthe 1950s and early 1960s. Engine plants at Lima, Ohio;
Dearborn, Michigan; and Windsor, Ontario, followed, each advancing the au-
tomation technology ofthe previous plant.
Although Del Harder's Manufacturing Division presided over the planning,
construction, and operation ofthese engine plants and a host ofother compo-
nents manufacturing plants such as transmission factories, brake plants, and
the like, the Controller's Office vigorously pursued control over the perfor-
mance of these plants. The Cleveland Engine Plant itself became a battle-
ground over cost accounting in a struggle between the Manufacturing Division
and the Controller's Office. McNamara and his minions developed a costing
system that projected theoretical costs and held them up against actually ob-
served costs. This system provided algorithms by which observed costs could
be adjusted to account for less-than-capacity output, but then these adjusted
costs were held up against the theoretical costs to expose less-than-satisfactory
operational performance. A long, heated dispute between the Manufacturing
Division and the Controller's Office over Cleveland Engine Plant costs prob-
ably occasioned an actual tour ofthe plantby Ford's board ofdirectors in 1954,
at which time the Manufacturing Division gave an extended-and pointed-
briefing about the manufacturing economics of the Cleveland plant in which
data at variance with the Controller's Office was presented.56
The battle between "the bean counters" and "the operations people" contin-
ued at Ford during the 1950s. The company's accounting and control systems
became the stuff of legends during this period, and the Ford Motor Company
became an important training ground for an entire generation of managers
committed to quantitative analysis and management by numbers. At the same
time, Ford's operations people continued to pioneer in the development ofau-
tomation, and in the late 1950s the company took a vital leadership role in the
standardization oftransfer machines, the heart of"Detroit automation." 57 The
56. "Review of Cleveland Operations," October 1954, Ford Industrial Archives, 65-71:8. An
example ofMcNamara's department's reviews ofCleveland Engine Plant costs is "Comparison of
Monthly Costs with Planned Costs, 1952 Ford 6 Overhead Valve Engine," 24 November 1952,
Ford Industrial Archives, 65-17:10. As one member of the Controller's Office wrote in 1954,
"[T]he whole subject of the cost differential on engines has been such a touchy one for several
years" (W. H. Guinn to L. P. Hourihan, 3 February 1954, Ford Industrial Archives, 71-2:4).
57. Ford's work on standardization ofautomation equipment, particularly transfer machinery, is
reviewed in David A. Hounshell, ''Automation, Transfer Machinery, and Mass Production in the
U.S. Automobile Industry in the Post-World War II Era," paper delivered at the annual meeting of
the Society for the History ofTechnology, London, 2 August 1996.207 Assets, Organizations, Strategies, and Traditions
Executive Committee meeting of 2 December 1949 clearly offered a portent
ofthis future.
During the 1980s, with the apparent growing weakness ofthe U.S. automo-
bile industry vis-a-vis that ofJapan, ironically both "bean counting" and "De-
troit automation" came under attack as the root causes ofU.S. decline, and of
the Ford Motor Company.58 Assessing whether this facile diagnosis was accu-
rate will, I suppose, occupy historians and business analysts for a long time.
Those who take up this subject should unquestionably ponder the events that
led up to the Ford Motor Company's Executive Committee meeting of 2 De-
cember 1949 and ask what decision rules, organizational principles, and inter-
personal dynamics were in operation that day that changed the course that the
company had charted a mere three years earlier.
Was the outcome of this fateful meeting preordained or inevitable? When
examined through the lens ofArrow's "codes" or Nelson and Winter's "rou-
tines," then perhaps the reversal taken at the meeting seems virtually inevi-
table. When viewed through the lens of history, Ford's long-time and deep
commitments to mass production, as embodied at the River Rouge plant, seem
to have run over the attempts by some to reorient the company and to do things
in a different way; the sheer mass of these commitments-both physical and
psychological-moving through time gave them an inertia that was simply too
great to redirect.59 The demands of the post-World War II automobile market
also surely played a role in the Executive Committee's decision to reverse its
course. Increasingly, Ford's executives realized that, if they could just make
enough cars to satisfy the enormous demand, they could return the company
to profitability. The imperatives ofproduction were enormous, and as as those
who have studied the postwar automobile industry have recognized, manufac-
turers (including the independents) pursued the same strategies ofcommitting
more deeply to Fordist production regimes. As Womack, Jones, and Roos write
in The Machine That Changed the World (63), in 1955 "six models accounted
for 80 percent ofall cars sold" in the United States.
Yet even within Ford's top ranks, sentiment remained for building a broader
product line through the creation of an entirely new division that would have
autonomy in both production and sales. Although most histories of the Ford
Motor Company's attempts to introduce the Edsel in 1957 focus on the car's
terrible design as contributing to the Edsel's becoming one ofthe greatest di-
sasters in marketing history, they often overlook the original ideafor the Edsel.
The Edsel was "created" in 1955 both to broaden the company's product line
58. See, e.g., Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, and Robert M. Solow, eds., Made in
America: Regaining the Productive Edge (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); James P. Womack, Dan-
iel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine That Changed the World (New York: Rawson, 1990).
59. Although my (more scientifically precise) language here varies from that used by the histo-
rian of technology Thomas P. Hughes, we are essentially discussing the same phenomenon. See
Hughes, "Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany, 1898-1933;' Pastand
Present 44 (August 1969): 106-32.208 David A. Hounshell
and to serve as the vehicle by which the company created a new division. It
led to Ford's splitting the Lincoln-Mercury Division into two separate divisions
(recall that this was the same goal pursued in the immediate postwar period),
an independent Lincoln Division and an independent Mercury Division
(headed by the Edsel's chief promoter). The Edsel was supposed to give the
Mercury Division enough product to warrant its autonomy in both sales and
manufacture.6o Ultimately, the strategy did not work, and the Lincoln and Mer-
cury divisions were reunited. Robert McNamara, by then head of the Ford
Division, opposed the plan for the Edsel. While the debacle unfolded, he pur-
sued a different strategy of broadening his own division's product offerings,
introducing the Falcon compact at the lower end and moving toward what be-
came the Galaxie at the top end, with the traditional Fairlane in the middle.
McNamara, whose promulgation ofPlanA had led directly to the fateful meet-
ing in 1948 that had reversed the strategy of decentralization of production,
had triumphed again in the centralization of the Ford Motor Company. Soon,
he would do the same for the U.S. Department of Defense under Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson.
61
Comment Sidney G. Winter
David Hounshell's paper sets forth a historical question about what happened
at a single meeting that occurred at the Ford Motor Company in December
1949-but he doesn't answer the question. He just frames it very nicely, ex-
plores some possible interpretations, and then leaves it up for grabs. "Fortu-
nately," he remarks, we do not know what actually happened during the meet-
ing itself. We can only operate in the Sherlock Holmes mode, making
inferences based on the specific historical facts that Hounshell carefully de-
scribes, and guided by our general theoretical understanding oforganizations.
It is an understatement to say that I welcome the opportunity to address
this challenge. In his sharply focused study, Hounshell not only invokes broad
theoretical issues that have fascinated me for many years, but also raises more
specific questions with historical connections to ones that I have previously
encountered and thought about.
l
60. On Edsel, see Nevins and Hill, Ford: Decline andRebirth, 380, 384-87.
61. On McNamara's centralization of the Pentagon, see David R. Jardini, "Out of the Blue
Yonder: The RAND Corporation's Diversification into Social Welfare Research, 1946-1968;'
Ph.D. diss., Carnegie Mellon University, 1996.
Sidney G. Winter is the Deloitte and Touche Professor of Management at the Wharton School
ofthe University ofPennsylvania.
1. In particular, I have had the occasion to reflect on the managerial style and skills of one of
the key protagonists in Hounshell's story, Robert S. McNamara. I had the opportunity for a rela-
tively close-in view when I did a briefstint in the systems analysis office ofMcNamara's Pentagon
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In his quest for an explanation ofthe outcome ofthe December 1949 meet-
ing' Hounshell considers arange ofpotentially helpful concepts and theoretical
schemes. The key words here include several that happen to be current favor-
ites in the strategic management literature, such as organizational capabilities,
codes, routines, core competencies, and so forth.
Although there are distinctions among the ideas evoked by these terms, there
is a sense in which they all come from the same family. In his classic book
Essence ofDecision (1971), Allison laid out three broad "models" (or para-
digms) for understanding organizational decisions: unitary rational actor, orga-
nizational process, and bureaucratic politics. In the Allison typology, all of
Hounshell's candidates for an explanatory role fall under the organizational-
process heading. In different ways, they all assert the tendency of an organi-
zation to adhere to its own established, and often idiosyncratic, behavioral
patterns. To understand what an organization did or might do in a particular
situation, one must look at how it responded to similar situations in the past.
In this paradigm, the very idea of a choice of actions is subject to skeptical
scrutiny. At most, top decision makers choose from menus defined and limited
by organizational processes rooted in the past. Attempts to choose things that
are not on those menus produce no result, or at least no coherent result.
The puzzle that Hounshell presents relates to the outcome of a meeting. It
matters which word is conceived to hold the heart ofthe puzzle. I am going to
proceed, tentatively, on the assumption that the mystery is in the meeting. A
short period of unobserved behavior of a few individuals appears to hold the
key to a mysteriously sharp discontinuity between the lines ofstrategic think-
ing favored by top management prior to the meeting and the actual course of
action the Ford organization subsequently followed. We have, thanks to Houn-
shell, a large amount ofbackground information about the meeting, but know
nothing ofits details. What could possibly have happened at the meeting?
If this is the puzzle, then the organizational process model is not the right
tool kit, for it is not about meetings. Allison's bureaucratic politics model,2 on
the other hand, is about meetings-in fact, about precisely the sort ofmeeting
that is at issue here. In Allison's terms, this is a meeting of "Chiefs"-oftop
managers who have distinct and generally dissimilar realms of authority and
responsibility in the organization. The Chiefs in this case are gathered in the
presence ofa Senior Chief (Henry Ford II), and their legitimate role in such a
setting is to advise their superior on questions relating to the overall direction
ofthe organization.
Before applying the model to the case, let me review its key features. Orga-
nizational actions are viewed as the outcomes ofinternal political processes or
"games." 3 The participants are "players in positions"-the players are differ-
2. Also known as the governmental politics model.
3. Allison notes (1971, 163) that his use of the "games" terminology owes something to game
theory (particularly ofthe Thomas Schelling variety), but at least as much to Wittgenstein's discus-
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entiated by their managerial responsibilities. These responsibilities are not
merely different but, in general, asymmetrical-the players have different
sorts ofresponsibilities. In particular, they may have different ranks in the for-
mal hierarchy of the organization, and different status in its informal hierar-
chies as well.
The situation of a player in a bureaucratic politics game is complex, both
motivationally and cognitively. It is axiomatic that players have personal goals,
especially career goals; they would not have attained the positions that admit
them to the game if they were not both smart and ambitious. Typically, both
the present position ofa player and the organization as a whole can be viewed,
from the player's perspective, as means to the end ofgreater personal success
in the future. It is true, ofcourse, that some basic goal alignment between the
players and the organization is provided by the fact that few players are likely
to gain if the organizational ship sinks under them. Similarly, the success of
the organization tends to advance the interests ofits top managers. In general,
however, a given manager has strong grounds to prefer some directions of or-
ganizational success to others; indeed, there may be successful directions that
are even more disadvantageous to an individual manager than a major organi-
zational failure would be. ''A successful career in a successful organization"
is the common goal of managers-common in form but sharply different in
substance from one manager to the next.
These considerations underlie the bureaucratic politics principle "Where
you stand depends on where you sit." It is not to be expected, for example, that
a player will be the leading advocate ofthe view that his orher own unit should
playa diminished role in the organization's future.
Cognitive biases associated with organizational positions tend to amplify
the effects ofimperfect goal alignment. Indeed, it is simplistic to interpret the
divergent views ofdifferent managers merely in terms oftheir individual pro-
clivities to pursue personal goals at the expense ofthe organization. In myriad
ways, the player's position shapes not only the information the player receives
about what is going on in the organization and the environment, but also the
mental models used to interpret that information and to project the conse-
quences ofaction.
For example, much of the information the manager receives is filtered
through subordinates; these subordinates typically have at least as much stake
in the future standing of their organizational unit as the boss does and are
consequently predisposed toward an "us against them" interpretive framework
for many situations ("them" being the rest of the organization). To promote
morale and loyal followership, an effective leader will repeatedly emphasize
the importance ofthe unit's work-andeven ifthese pep talks are largely role-
playing when the leader is new in the post, mechanisms of cognitive disso-
nance and other considerations tend in the course oftime to align the leader's
beliefs with the talk. Also, the leader's intraunit credibility and influence de-
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leader a more ardent advocate for the unit's cause (and for subordinates' views)
than might otherwise be the case.
The list continues. An important section ofthe list is under the heading "top
managers are presumptively subjectto the same cognitive biases that psycholo-
gists have repeatedly verified in experimental subjects." These biases include
tendencies to overoptimism, overconfidence (an exaggerated sense ofthe pre-
cision of judgments made under uncertainty), a preference for dealing with
confirming rather than disconfirming information (even in the absence of a
motivating stake in the relevant proposition), and the "hindsight bias" of be-
lieving retrospectively that what happened was largely foreseen. Considering
the nature ofthe processes by which people arrive in top managerial positions,
it would be logical to expect that these common biases are, if anything, more
prevalent in the selected group than in the population in general. These general
biases tend to reinforce the effects ofthe more situational biases noted above,
making them highly resistant to challenge.
4
These cognitive effects are aspects ofthe principle "What you see depends
on where you stand." The evidence considered, its evaluation, and the stakes
identified in the situation differ from player to player because oftheir different
stands on the issues. More precisely, what you see depends on where you stand
because, for example, of the preference for confirming information. It thus
depends indirectly, and partially, or where you sit. But what you see also de-
pends directly on where you sit, because, for example, ofinformation filtering
by subordinates.5
In the context of a meeting among managers from different units-and es-
pecially a meeting ofChiefs-the above considerations establish the following
structure of stakes for an individual player: (1) Enhance your long-term pros-
pects for promotion, expansion of authority, and other rewards. (2) Increase
your power, or at least don't lose power. "Power" is reflected concretely in the
allocation of control of action channels, that is, the buttons and levers that
actually make things happen in the organization, in the specific action channels
chosen for the problem at hand (you generally want your unit to "have the
action on this problem"), and in influence derived from access to superiors.
(3) Be on the winning side at the end of meeting; considerations of future
influence and credibility are relevant here along with the specific issues ofthe
meeting, so there are advantages to "winning" that extend beyond those of
winning on the issues, and may even outweigh the costs ofan unacknowledged
loss on the issues.
Turning to the case at hand, the first thing that the bureaucratic politics
model does for us is to deepen the mystery considerably. To see this, consider
4. See Gilovich (1991) for a lively discussion ofsome ofthe cognitive biases explored by psy-
chologists. These biases are highly relevant to theories ofdecision making, and in many ways the
psychologists' findings lend support to Allison's (unacknowledged) favorite among his three mod-
els, bureaucratic politics.
5. See Allison 1971,178.212 David A. Hounshell
the winners and losers from the Executive Committee meeting, invoking the
above conceptualization of the players' stakes and extending the evaluation
beyond the end ofthe meeting proper to the few weeks that followed.
The Winners: (1) Vice President (Manufacturing) Delmar Harder. Harder
ultimately emerged with control ofimportant new action channels-theCleve-
land Engine Plant and the Buffalo Stamping Plant, retained his authority over
the Rouge, and seemingly scored a victory at the start of the meeting over
Robert McNamara's challenge to the work ofthe Facilities Committee that he
chaired.6 (2) Controller Robert McNamara. In spite ofHarder's demolition of
his "PlanA," the meeting outcome reflected greatly increased sensitivity to the
cost issues raised in his 18 November memo, and a corresponding subordina-
tion ofthe goal ofdecentralization along product lines. Further, his own office
could, and did, offer a path to partial reconciliation ofthe competing demands
ofdivisional autonomy and cost control.
The Losers: (1) Lewis Crusoe, vice president and head ofthe Ford Division.
Crusoe had sought organizational control ofthe new Buffalo Stamping Plant,
which ultimately wound up under Harder. Further, as head ofthe dominant (by
far) product division, he had the most to gain in power terms from the com-
pany's embrace ofGM-style decentralization-anembrace that ended abruptly
with the meeting, leaving him with a much-diminished brand ofautonomy. (2)
Ernest Breech, executive vice president. From the time ofhis move from GM
to Ford in 1946, Breech had taken the lead in promoting and explaining decen-
tralization as the key to the revitalization of the company. Had the company
stayed on track in that direction, Breech would surely have played a key role
in more substantive implementation decisions-butby the end ofthe meeting,
the company had jumped that track. (3) Henry Ford II, president and CEO.
Even before the arrival ofBreech, Crusoe, and Harder, Ford had taken a small
step in the direction of divisionalization by creating the separate Lincoln-
Mercury Division. The movement toward decentralization that Breech spear-
headed obviously had Ford's support, according to Hounshell. Hence, the
setback suffered at the meeting by the general cause ofdecentralization neces-
sarily reflected adversely on the credibility of the company's leader. Only by
embracing a compromise that differed sharply from his orientation ofthe pre-
ceding years did Ford manage to emerge, formally, "on the winning side."7
What is striking about this list ofwinners and losers is that the winners are
junior in status to the losers. Hounshell does not concern himself explicitly
with the status ranking ofthe participants, but, based on the evidence put for-
ward, a reasonable estimate would be Ford, Breech, Crusoe(?-headofdomi-
nant product division), Harder (?-head of preeminent functional division),
6. "Plan A lay in shambles" (Hounshell's paper).
7. Hounshell does not tell us of any change in Ford's leadership role in the aftermath of the
meeting. One might speculate that it would evolve toward something more analogous to a constitu-
tional monarch and less to a prime minister-but whether that would happen depended substan-
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McNamara (subordinate to VP finance, functional division). Hence, the basic
mystery acquires the added dimension: how did the little guys prevail over the
big guys? Curiouser still: how did Harder and McNamara emerge as winners
in the immediate aftermath ofa period ofintense conflict between them? Frat-
ricidal warfare is not generally recommended as a tactic for coalitions. These
features ofthe meeting's outcome would be extremely unexpected and puzzling
in almost any organization at any time; I confine myself to the italics rather
than spelling out that case at length.
To unravel this deepened mystery, I first note the possible relevance of the
bureaucratic politics maxim "Beware ofOption B." 8 This maxim is a warning
to the holder of formal decision-making authority, in this case Henry Ford II.
It warns against a particular threat to his or her de facto control: if the task
of defining decision options is delegated to staff and subordinates, there is a
possibility that the real discretion will be exercised in the design ofthe options,
reducing the leader's "decision" to an act ofpro forma ratification. The appear-
ances of decision can be preserved as this goes on, if only one of the options
presented can really withstand scrutiny. More specifically, it often happens that
options A, B, and C can be arrayed along a continuum, and A and C can be
deliberately designed to be too extreme, each in its own direction. The problem
left for the leader is one that Goldilocks would get right. The important issues
were those addressed in the design of a particular candidate for the role of
Option B; some ofthose issues may have nothing to do with the A-B-C contin-
uum. The staff work on the problem leaves those issues hidden below the sur-
face when the leader finally sees the options.9
There are some parallels between this general "Beware of Option B" sce-
nario and what happened in the Executive Committee. There are three options,
McNamara's Plan A (which comes to us as the prelabeled candidate for the
role ofOption A), Harder's plan (which we label Option C), and the course of
action that actually emerges from the meeting, Option B. The three options
can be located on a continuum ofdegree ofconformity to the company's decen-
tralization principles, as those were interpreted prior to the meeting. Harder's
Facilities Committee accepted those decentralization principles as axiomatic
and reported accordingly. McNamara's 18 November memo rejected the axi-
oms, particularly the idea that "[e]ngine machining and assembly must be
segregated by end product division without regard to engine interchangeability
or relative operating costs of different plant sizes." Conciliatory words about
the "rule oforganizational separation" notwithstanding, McNamara's plan was
8. Option B is discussed briefly in Halperin 1974,210. I cannot provide a specific cite for the
maxim, but it (the maxim) is definitely out there.
9. This can all transpire regardless ofwhether those involved in the staffing actually conspire to
withhold some issues from the leader's decision, or are simply and sincerely trying to help out.
The process generally is helpful to the leader in at least the following senses: (1) the task of
designing Option B forces resolution ofconflictual issues among subordinate Chiefs, and (2) time
and attention demands on the leader are reduced. The latter benefit is less valuable when a key
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essentially defiant of the company's decentralization thrust. The actual out-
come, Option B, is intermediate on the decentralization dimension, and inter-
mediate in a particular way-a way that turns out to be quite favorable to the
bureaucratic interests of Harder and McNamara. Finally, it seems reasonable
to doubt that Option B would have been well received by Ford if it had been
advanced without the context provided by A and C. Thus, there are some hints
here that boss Ford was "taken"-though perhaps to his long-term benefit-
by his subordinates Harder and McNamara, by means of mechanisms sug-
gested by "Beware ofOption B." But, ofcourse, the standard analysis does not
literally apply, because Harder and McNamara did not act as a team in framing
the options.
Or did they? Here, my quest for an answer to Hounshell's challenge comes
to a fork in the road. Down one branch lies the suggestion that the essential
dynamics of"Beware ofOption B" might have arisen accidentally in the meet-
ing, and the thought that this might have happened makes a very puzzling
course ofevents marginally less puzzling. It is "as if" the Option B device had
been employed. This interpretation has some appeal, but it requires that the
"winner" status ofHarder and McNamara be regarded as coincidental, and it
still leaves the basic outcome quite puzzling. In particular, virtually everything
that is known about the episode up through Harder's demolition of McNa-
mara's Plan A seems to point toward a reaffirmation of the committee's deci-
sion of4 November, supporting Option C. How could McNamara's deviant and
demolished plan have carried the weight required ofit in this story?
I will take the other fork, which addresses these objections but is consider-
ably more adventuresome. On this alternative interpretation, the hints of "Be-
ware ofOption B" mechanisms are valid clues to what happened, and the dra-
matic conflict between Harder and McNamara was, well, drama. I postulate
that Harder and McNamara reached a meeting of minds on three points: (1)
that the decentralization rhetoric ofBreech and Ford was fundamentally out of
touch with the economic and technical realities of the Ford Motor Company,
(2) that the fact that President Ford himself was firmly identified with the de-
centralization cause, together with the bureaucratic power and stakes ofBreech
and Crusoe, made it very unlikely that any straightforward challenge to the
policy would succeed, and (3) that a feigned conflict between the two ofthem
could create an opening that would get key facts on the table for discussion.
Implicitly at least, they also agreed that their individual interests in "asuccess-
ful career in a successful organization" could be better served by this risky
maneuverthan by keeping theirheads down while the boss made a big mistake.
In ''A Docudrama" (see below) I offer my speculation as to how the Harder-
McNamara interactions might have been initiated.
Even the bold assumption of a Harder-McNamara conspiracy still seems
inadequate to account for the outcome. The question ofhow McNamara's "de-
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only one answer: regardless of what happened to his plan, not all of McNa-
mara's analysis was demolished. The point to the feigned conflict, I suggest,
was this: when the dust settled, the Executive Committee was left staring at
an important area of agreement between the combatants. From Hounshell's
discussion, it is plausible that this area ofagreement might have embraced (1)
the existence of significant economies ofscale in engine manufacture, (2) the
fact that the River Rouge plant remained a valuable asset when its costs were
correctly assessed on a forward-looking basis, and (3) the fact that the Rouge
"simply would not parse along productlines." Taken seriously, these considera-
tions are enough to open the door for Option B. Ofcourse, these points could
have been raised without the feigned conflict setting-but the question "what
is your main point here" would probably have arisen early, and giving the an-
swer "to challenge decentralization" would not have promoted constructive
discussion. There had to be some cover.
A Docudrama
Conversation in a hallway at the headquarters ofthe Ford Motor Company,
circa third quarter, 1949.
Controller Robert McNamara and Vice President (Manufacturing) Del
Harder are in a group leaving a meeting led by Executive Vice PresidentErnest
Breech. Breech has spoken, once again, about the virtues ofGM-style decen-
tralization. As Harder departs, McNamara strides alongside him-this is not
the way to the controller's office.
McNAMARA: I think decentralization will bring great things to the Company
in the future ...
HARDER [noncommittally]: Yeah.
McNAMARA: ... assuming ofcourse that you don't mind losing money.
HARDER [startled]: How's that?
McNAMARA: Well, we're finally coming to crunch time between the GM
model and Ford realities. We're going to see whetherthe model fits. Frankly,
I don't see how it can-except in some very costly and unprofitable way.
HARDER: Why shouldn't it fit? It worked pretty well at GM, even if Breech
does exaggerate that point a bit.
McNAMARA: For openers, Ford is a smaller company than GM and has fewer
makes of cars-and the Ford models dwarf the other two makes in sales.
Are we really going to have vertically integrated divisions where each divi-
sion has its own manufacturing? That would mean big cost sacrifices be-
cause ofthe small scale ofthose operations. But that seems to be the picture
that's developing.
HARDER: Yeah, a multidivision company with one division that counts. You
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McNAMARA: Then there is the Rouge, which is part ofyour responsibility. My
figures show that, with reasonable utilization, costs there could be quite low
compared to anything we could do in a new facility-partly because so
much of the capital cost at the Rouge is sunk. But how can you divide up
the Rouge among different divisions? It just doesn't divide that way-at-
tempting to do so flies in the face of the idea that motivated the Rouge in
the first place.
HARDER: I think you're right.
McNAMARA: -and there's the question of the organizational future of the
Rouge facility. I've heard people say "The Ford Division is the Ford Motor
Company," and I've also heard "The Rouge is the Ford Motor Company."
Now, what does that tell you?
HARDER: Crusoe expresses nothing but contempt for the Rouge-white ele-
phant, antiquated, insuperable union problems, and so forth. But I'm not
sure that he fully expresses his views.
McNAMARA: Neither am I.
[Long pause: McNamara looks at Harder; Harder stares blankly into space.]
HARDER: You know, I've been puzzled myself about how this would all work
out in the end. Maybe the two ofus should have lunch somewhere and talk
it through.
McNAMARA: Fine by me. I'll have my secretary set it up. [He turns andwalks
back in the directionfrom which they came.]
A final question about the meeting is who proposed Option B, the idea of
pursuing a shallower type of decentralization using transfer pricing and other
control schemes to reconcile a degree of product-division autonomy with the
traditional Ford pursuit of economies of scale in production. Hounshell sug-
gests that it might have been McNamara. While it is very plausible, almost
inescapable, that McNamara was a principal architect of the compromise, it
would not be tactically sound for him to offer it in the meeting (certainly not
in the context ofmy interpretation ofthe events, but also more generally). My
candidate for this role is Theodore Yntema, McNamara's immediate superior,
an economist who would attend carefully to an argument revolving about
costs, present values, and transfer pricing schemes, and a comparatively disin-
terested party in the battle over control of production facilities. Yntema need
not have been aware of the postulated Harder-McNamara conspiracy. For ex-
ample, one could imagine McNamara approaching Yntema with concerns
about possible conflict at the 2 December meeting, and making a request for
his assistance in keeping the strongest and most important points ofhis analy-
sis from being lost from view in the scuffle. With Yntema's cooperation in that
regard, both Harder and McNamara could playa subdued role in the latter part
ofthe meeting and avoid looking like the winners they were.
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reopen the question of whether the meeting, the outcome, or something else
entirely deserves to be at the focus of attention. In many ways, my account of
the meeting simply adds color to the interplay ofconsiderations that Hounshell
set forth and interpreted from an organizational-process viewpoint. Indeed, so
far as the outcome is concerned, the episode must be scored as a triumph for
the organizational process/organizational inertia family oftheories. Here is the
question: in its first major postwar expansion ofengine capacity, the Ford Mo-
tor Company will build X new engine plants; what is X? Three years of top
management talk suggest X == 2 or more; a historical look at capabilities and
practices suggests X == 1, and the latter is correct. So who needs to under-
stand meetings?
Allison's unitary rational-actor model also deserves a credit line here. Bu-
reaucratic stratagems and skills aside, Harder and McNamara had, in my view,
something very important going for them: they were basically right. They were
right at least in the sense that their analyses started from the given situation in
the company-its actual "idiosyncratic resource endowment," as the propo-
nents ofthe resource-based view of the firm would describe it. 1O By contrast,
the decentralization efforts seem to have started from a vision ofa desired end
state, "be organized more like General Motors." The difficulties encountered
in explicating this goal to the Ford community may reflect the persistence of
organizational "codes," as Hounshell suggests-but it could also reflect the
failure of the proponents to think the problem all the way through. Thus, in
spite ofdramatic contrasts between the decision process and the conventional
image of rational decision, one could argue that the outcome of the meeting
was largely a consequence ofreality constraints surfacing. (I am more tempted
by this interpretation than Hounshell appears to be.) It is a virtue of the
rational-actor model that it leads one to expect reality constraints to surface
sooner or later-but it can be quite misleading about when.
A final lesson about the comparative merits of the organizational process
and bureaucratic politics approaches can be drawn from this discussion. The
trouble with the bureaucratic politics approach is that it has an unbounded
appetite for data. Hounshell's experience of discovering a great deal of infor-
mation about the meeting, but not what actually "ensued," is illustrative of a
general problem. Even if he had a videotape of the meeting, he still would
not know whether my conspiracy theory is correct; there is no record of the
conversation in my docudrama. While I have taken unusual liberties in filling
the gaps in my story with my own speculations, no one can write a bureau-
cratic-politics account ofa decision episode without some gap-filling-partic-
ularly the passive kind that accepts "absence of evidence as evidence of ab-
sence" when ignoring the possibility ofhidden manipulations, stratagems, and
other factors. This is a critical weakness in the bureaucratic-politics paradigm
as a scientific program, and even more critical for real-time prediction pur-
10. See, e.g., the papers in the volume edited by Cynthia Montgomery (1995).218 David A. Hounshell
poses-though the paradigm remains a valuable area of study for aspiring
players.
The models in the organizational-process family do not suffer this weak-
ness. Relative to bureaucratic politics, the proponents of organizational-pro-
cess models take a more positivistic view: give us enough opportunity for
thoughtful study of how observable events up to T have apparently shaped
those at T + 1 in various contexts in the past, and we will come up with in-
sights that are helpful even though Ts events are imperfectly known and even
when T + 1is next year. I remain committed to my own "evolutionary" version
ofthat general approach, and must accordingly concede that Hounshell's inter-
pretive efforts were on the right track after all.
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